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FOREWORD
BILL BEANEY'S CONTINUING RELEVANCE
ALAN K. CHEN'

I am honored to contribute this brief essay in honor of my friend,
colleague, and mentor, William Beaney. His recent passing brings great
sadness to all of us in the University of Denver community. Yet, as with
the end of every well-lived life, this sober occasion provides us with an
opportunity to reflect on the manner in which that life touched us as individuals and as a community. It also allows us to look back on the
broader national significance of a rich professional career.
I had the privilege of getting to know Bill in the later years of his
life. Bill formally "retired" in 1989, three years before I joined the College of Law faculty. Fortunately for me, as well as for the entire DU
community, Bill continued to teach as an emeritus professor until just a
few years ago. He also continued to read and think about thorny issues of
constitutional law and theory, provide thoughtful comments on drafts of
law review articles, and patiently mentor at least one novice constitutional law professor. This was an extraordinary level of professional activity for someone who was supposedly winding down his career.
Indeed, a remarkable feature of Bill's career as one of the nation's
leading constitutional law scholars and teachers was not only its longevity-he took his first teaching position in 1949-but also its substantial
influence on multiple generations of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars.
Perhaps, however, I should dispense with the past tense, for there appears
to be no slowing down now. Bill remains influential in the legal world
and likely will always be so. This essay is a tribute to Bill Beaney's continuing relevance.'

Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
t
1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1985. Thanks to the Denver University Law Review for inviting
me to share these thoughts. I can think of no better tribute to Bill Beaney's legacy than to publish
these observations in a scholarly journal.
I. This essay focuses on Bill's contributions to both the course of law and the academic
world. In doing so, I do not mean to diminish Bill's numerous other professional and personal accomplishments, including his selfless military service, the public service he provided through numerous roles as a consultant to various government agencies, his institutional citizenship on behalf
of the University of Denver (Bill twice served as Acting Dean for the College of Law and provided
institutional support in numerous other ways, both large and small), or the bonds he established with
his family and close friends.
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I. THE INFLUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLAR

I am embarrassed to confess that I had never heard of Bill Beaney
before I entered the academic world. While other renowned constitutional law scholars received greater recognition in the national community and grabbed the attention of the media, Bill's national influence was
quieter, though no less powerful.
Over the course of his career, Bill exhibited three signal characteristics of a great legal scholar. First, he was incredibly prolific. Even a brief
glance at Bill's record of legal scholarship should be jaw dropping to any
legal academic.2 Bill wrote, coauthored, or edited multiple books about
the law and more than a dozen major law review articles. That list does
not even include the numerous studies and reports Bill produced for government agencies or other shorter expositions about important legal topics.
Second, Bill's scholarship was of tremendous quality. As even a
casual reader of his work could discern, his research was exhaustive, his
analysis both incisive and rigorous, and his approach balanced and
thoughtful. He was also an elegant writer. Even on the most technical of
subjects, his prose is flowing and lucid. These qualities of Bill's scholarly work were recognized not only by several of the nation's most prestigious law reviews, but also by the academic presses, which published
his widely influential scholarship in political science and law.
Another mark of the quality of Bill's work is that it continues to be
cited regularly. A recent search on the electronic Westlaw database re-

2.
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955)
[hereinafter, BEANEY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL]; William M. Beaney, John MarshallHarlan: A Modern
Conservative Justice, in AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 121 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., ed., 1991); William M. Beaney, The Supreme Court: The Perspective of Political Science, in MAX FREEDMAN ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON
THE COURT 34 (1967); William M. Beaney, Justice William 0. Douglas: The Constitution in a Free
Society, 51 IND. L.J. 18 (1975); William M. Beaney, Fairnessin University Disciplinary Proceedings, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 390 (1971); William M. Beaney, The Warren Courtand the Political
Process, 67 MICH. L. REV. 343 (1969); William M. Beaney, Students, Higher Education and the
Law, 45 DENV. L.J. 511 (1968); William M. Beaney, The Griswold Case and the ExpandingRight to
Privacy, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 979 [hereinafter, Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy]; William M.
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966) [hereinafter, Beaney, Privacy and American Law]; William M. Beaney & Edward Beiser, Prayer and
Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. LAW 475 (1964);
William M. Beaney, Comment, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REV.
1150 (1963); William M. Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
SUP. CT. REV. 212 (1962) [hereinafter, Beaney, Constitutional Right of Privacy]; William M.
Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1961); William M. Beaney,
Teaching of Law Courses in the LiberalArts College: A View from the College, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC.
55 (1961); William M. Beaney, Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction, 8 J. PUB. LAW 66 (1959).
Bill also coauthored a number of books with his Princeton colleague, the equally renowned Alpheus
Mason. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 516 (6th ed. 1978); ALPHEUS THOMAS
MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY (1959).
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veals 162 law review articles citing Bill's scholarship.3 This number is
even more impressive given that Westlaw databases have a modern bias
because they do not include older publications. Accordingly, most of
these citations are in recent work. Moreover, leading constitutional
scholars in the present generation of academics continue to refer to Bill's
work.4
Finally, Bill's research demonstrated great breadth. The scope of his
work within constitutional law, which, during the heyday of his career,
included the field that we now call "criminal procedure," is noteworthy.
Bill wrote about numerous substantive constitutional law topics, including due process, privacy, school prayer, and the right to counsel. He also
wrote tomes and gave lectures about bridging the gap between law and
political science. In fact, it is the interdisciplinary nature of Bill's work
that led Dean Robert Yegge to recruit him from the Princeton political
science department to our faculty in the late 1960s (a decade after Bill
turned down an offer from Dean Edward Levi to be appointed to the faculty of the prestigious University of Chicago School of Law). 5 Bill was
deeply interested in how law and society intersected in ways meaningful
both to the study of law and to the betterment of society. 6 His interdisciplinary approach to law was spurred by his belief that there was no
meaningful difference between the study of government and political
science and the study of law and that the connections between law and
politics were to be explored, not ignored.7
But fairly evaluating Bill Beaney's scholarly contributions must go
farther than mere quantitative and qualitative assessment and extend to
an examination of their influence on the development of constitutional
law. Bill's continuing relevance clearly emerges from a brief look at
these topics.

List on file with author.
3.
4. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law. Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1745 n.65 (2003), Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1491, 1503 n.55 (2002); Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause

Jurisprudence,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1092 n.13 (2000); Louis Michael Seidman, Book Review,
Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281,
2293 n.74 (1998).
5. See Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping
Lawfor the Last Stages of the SocialActivist State, 32 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 409,428 (1998).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY ET AL., DENVER PLEA BARGAINING REDUCTION PROJECT:
AN EVALUATION (1979) (study with Professors Larry Tiffany and Joyce Sterling examining possible
impact of program restricting plea bargaining). For a description of Bill's place in the Law and
Society movement, see Garth & Sterling, supra note 5, at 426-28.
7.
For excellent historical accounts of Bill Beaney's place in this important intellectual
movement, see Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REV. 620, 663
n.216 (1994) (noting that "[tiwo excellent examples of the perspective of political scientists in the
post-World War H era regarding the political nature of the Supreme Court are found in the 1965
Rosenthal Lecture given by political scientist William M. Beaney and in Mason's and Beaney's
textbook."); Garth & Sterling, supranote 5, at 426-28.
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Bill's work unquestionably influenced the courts. His scholarship
was cited in United States Supreme Court opinions in eleven cases over a
span of 41 years. 8 Notably, Supreme Court Justices cited Bill in landmark cases in two of the substantive areas about which he wrote most
extensively -- the constitutional right of privacy and criminal defendants'
right to counsel. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas's majority
opinion referred to Bill's privacy scholarship in its now famous section
discussing the "penumbra" of rights emanating from the specific freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 9 In Miranda v. Arizona, Justice
Harlan's dissent drew upon Bill's widely cited book on the right to counsel in describing the background against which the law of confessions
was developed.10
Indeed, Bill's work foreshadowed the development of much of the
Court's constitutional privacy jurisprudence. For example, in a seminal
article published three years before the Court decided Griswold, he observed that "[imn a sense virtually all enumerated rights in the Constitution can be described as contributing to the right of privacy, if by the
term is meant the integrity and freedom of the individual person and personality."'" Noting that Justice Douglas, who would later write the majority opinion in Griswold, had made such an argument in his published
writings, Bill also anticipated the potential weaknesses of this "penumbra" approach. 12 After surveying the historical developments of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a source of a constitutional
privacy right, Bill concluded that privacy might better be grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and its protection of "liberty." ' 3 This analytical framework essentially traces, in advance, the trajectory of the Supreme Court's privacy cases that would be decided over
the next forty years. 14

8.
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lassiter
v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 52 n.20 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 831 n.42 (1975); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 n.2 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 n.3 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 520 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 569 n.7 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958), overruled in part by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) and abrogated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966).
9.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (citing Beaney, ConstitutionalRight of Privacy, supranote 2).
10.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 520 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL, supra note 2).

11.
Beaney, ConstitutionalRight of Privacy, supra note 2, at 214.
12. Id. ("Apart from requiring a coverage of virtually all of the recognized constitutional
rights, such a category involves the use of a new concept in situations where adequate, if imperfect,
categories under which analysis can proceed already exist.").
13. Id. at 248.
14.
Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (locating privacy right in
penumbra emanating from specific provisions of the Bill of Rights), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (finding woman's privacy right in termination of early term pregnancies in liberty
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What is more, Bill's scholarship anticipated and supported many
important developments in the constitutional approach to individual privacy rights that would emerge over this period. In 1966, he articulated
his vision of constitutional privacy as follows: "Not all of mankind desire
or need privacy, but for those who do, a freedom to determine the extent
to which others may share in one's spiritual nature, and the ability to
protect one's beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations from unreasonable intrusions are of the very essence of life in a free society."' 5 Last
term, in the path-breaking privacy decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
Kennedy, echoing Bill Beaney's views, observed that:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon... [private consensual sexual relationships] in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
allows homosexual persons the
liberty protected by the Constitution
16
right to make this choice.
Another way in which Bill influenced and anticipated the development of constitutional law is through his understanding about the necessity for the Supreme Court to adopt a fluid understanding of constitutional meaning. As he wrote in a post-Griswoldarticle:
The relevant values of society, its changing needs and demands, and
the roles assumed by other agencies of government all seem to influence the way the Court perceives its function. In this sense, the Constitution resembles less a contract to be literally applied, and instead
begins to appear as a statement of political principles, to be interapplied by the Court in the light of changing circumpreted and
7
stances.'
Or, as Bill put it more simply, "law cannot be static, unless a society is
also static."' 8 In these observations, Bill foreshadowed a recent trend on
the Supreme Court of looking to changes in the non-judicial world as one
source for defining important constitutional rights.' 9

component of due process clause) and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476-84 (2003) (finding
right of privacy for same sex couples engaged in consensual sexual relationships in liberty component of due process clause).
15.

Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy,supra note 2, at 995.

16.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.

17.

Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy,supra note 2, at 986.

Beaney, Privacyand American Law, supra note 2, at 255.
18.
See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480-83 (drawing upon changes in societal acceptance
19.
of consensual gay relationships and upon developments in other western legal systems in defining
the scope of liberty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002) (viewing pattern of state law
opposition to execution of mentally retarded persons as relevant to determination of whether such
executions constitute cruel and unusual punishment barred by Eighth Amendment).
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Moreover, Bill understood well before it was obvious that privacy
law would have to develop in response to significant technological advances that enable government actors to acquire and catalogue important,
personal information about citizens. In one piece, he wrote:
Since we are entering the age of total information as a result of the
efforts of scientifically-minded administrators in business, government, and throughout our society; and since the technical means for
efficient gathering, storing, and retrieval are readily available, this
may turn out to be a significant battleground testing the limits of privacy of20 information against the demand of the government "to
know."

Criminal procedure scholars now take this point for granted. But Bill
wrote these words in 1966, a year before the Supreme Court even decided Katz v. United States,21 in which Justice Harlan's famous concurrence established that government conduct is limited by the Fourth
Amendment only where the person subject to that conduct has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as defined by societal understandings.22
That test has spawned many contemporary privacy debates, ranging from
the constitutionality of police use of infrared thermal imaging technology23 to government surveillance of private telephone and email communications. 4
Looking back at Bill's impressive record of scholarship, it is clear
that he left behind a rich and meaningful body of work that current and
future generations of judges and professors can continue to draw upon
for insight and guidance. Bill Beaney's scholarship has continuing relevance.
II. THE PATIENT MENTOR
Bill Beaney was much more than a brilliant legal scholar. He was
also a giving and gracious colleague, a model institutional citizen.
In 1992, when I joined the faculty of the University of Denver College of Law, I thought I knew a fair amount about constitutional law.
After all, by that time I had studied constitutional law with some of the
nation's leading experts, clerked for a federal judge, and spent several
years as a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union, where my
20. Beaney, Expanding Right of Privacy, supra note 2, at 991.
21.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). A majority of the Court has since
adopted Justice Harlan's approach. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
23. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-40 (2001) (holding that government use of
thermal imaging technology to detect heat from a private home is a search protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA PatriotAct and Telecommunications: Privacy
UnderAttack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371 (2003) (discussing privacy implications of
USA Patriot Act's electronic surveillance provisions).
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docket exclusively consisted of constitutional litigation. As many a
young law teacher quickly learns, however, even an experienced practitioner generally knows only some facets of his or her field and usually
cannot comprehend the breadth of knowledge necessary to becoming a
good teacher. I was soon stunned by how little I knew about constitutional law.
Fortunately, there was someone on our faculty who did know a lot
about constitutional law. I soon found myself visiting Bill Beaney's office on a regular basis, taking advantage of as many individual tutorials
as he could bear. In my initial, rather sheepish, approaches, I would
gather together specific interrogatories and Bill would fire off answers in
a blink. Soon, however, I began to worry that I was something of a pest.
Like the television character Columbo, I would return to Bill's office
again and again, apologetically muttering, "Umm, Bill, could I ask you
just one more question?"
Bill never made me feel stupid or ignorant, but patiently discussed
the issues with me in a thoughtful manner. He treated me with respect, as
a peer, rather than a neophyte. Whether he was explaining nuances of
late eighteenth century political relationships or the incoherence of the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, he provided a rich
and entertaining source of insight and information. Bill always had a
twinkle in his eye when we got together. I have no illusions that this was
because he particularly loved talking with me. Rather, it was clear to me
that Bill loved talking about constitutional law.
Not only did Bill give his time generously to my teaching queries,
but also he provided his insights on my own legal scholarship. When I
gave him a draft of the first law review article I wrote as a law professor,
I assumed that he would not have the time, inclination, or interest to provide me with any feedback. But he soon invited me to his office and gave
me valuable and insightful substantive comments that enhanced my
thinking and enriched my published work.
With his help, and a lot of hard work, I hope that I have overcome
my initial professorial deficiencies. Bill taught me more than substantive
doctrinal and historical knowledge, though. He taught me that a good
constitutional law professor undergoes a constant learning process, always studying, examining, and reexamining his or her understandings of
the manner in which constitutional law emerges and evolves. I have
taken these lessons to heart and they will always influence my teaching
and scholarship. As I wrote to him in the last days of his life, "Bill, you
are with me every time I walk into a classroom to teach Constitutional
Law." We will all miss you, but to me, you are still here. You will always be relevant.

